In mathematics, economics, and computer science, the stable marriage problem (also stable matching problem or SMP) is the problem of finding a stable matching between two equally sized sets of elements given an ordering of preferences for each element.
Download all course pages [zip - 10MB]Video and audio elements from this course are also available on: Ben Polak is Professor of Economics and Management in the Department of Economics and the School of Management at Yale University. A second aim is to predict how other people or organizations behave when they are in strategic settings. We will learn new concepts, methods and terminology. Most of the reading for this course comes from the first ten chapters of Dutta or from the first two parts of Watson. The readings are not compulsory, but they will help back up the class material.
Introductory microeconomics (115 or equivalent) is required.
A third aim is to apply these tools to settings from economics and from elsewhere. Problem sets: 30% Midterm examination: 30% Final examination: 40% Please take a few minutes to share your thoughts about this course through the survey linked below.
Some may prefer to take the course next academic year once they have more background.
Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere. We will also refer to ideas like probability and expectation.